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of ownership of the process of reconcilia tion by

creating tools and modem institutions based

grass roots communities, of confidence and

on integrative practices of Rwanda n culture. In

h armony which cha racterize h enceforth the

future. NURC should capitalize its successes by

social relations among Rwandans: 72 o/o of the

s trengthening the ca pacities of communities at

popu la tion are of the opinion that the situation

all levels so that they cou ld u ndertake and

in the country has ma rkedly improved . Fina lly.

realize

among other results there is room for · sha ring
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reconciliation
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by

experien ces with delegation s and researchers
from various countries, and the creation of a

THEME III: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

"Peace and Leaders hip Cen ter ··. 56 o/o of the
Rwa nda n popula tion know very well activities
carried out by NU RC.
Expe1iences gained by NURC have s h own that
establishing con fidence and healing the trauma
are the central aspects in the process of reconciliation. that the use of local cult ure was a
determin ing factor. and that national unity and
reconcilia tion concern various aspects of political and socioeconomic life, from which it follows
that there is a need to adopt a holistic approach
to facing these imperatives. Finally. it is the
s tr ong will and the determination of the
Rwandans to get up to their feet again after the
genocide which are at the origin of the progress
a chieved so far in the political, s ocia l and
economic doma ins.
NURC does not ignore the huge challenges
which remain: the compensation fund for genocide survivors. the living conditions of the latter. disclosing the truth in Gacaca jmisdictions
and security of the victims and the witnesses,
poverty and illiteracy, insecurity in the region
and the obstinacy of the genocidal ideology.
Nevertheless. NURC achievements are quite
impressive. More particularly. it has managed
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History of military integration is as old as that
of armed forces. Military integration is the
result of the existence of segregation in armed
forces or in society itself. It is an a ffirmative
action which dissipates fear and frustration.
guarantees individual and collective security
and strengthens reconciliation and stability of a
divided society.
Pre-colonial Rwanda had an inclusive army.
composed of Hutus. Tutsis and Twas. It had the
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mandate to protect and to expand the national
"

cide context, there were new developments due

territory. During the colonization era (1894-

to the multiple challenges which the country

1959). the army became a tool in the service of

had to face, notably the challenge to reconcile

the colonial administration to dominate and

the imperatives of justice and reconciliation as

exploit the colonized. In 1959 was born an

well as to ensure sustainable peace. For that

army which was ethnically homogeneous whose

purpose, it was necessary to involve political

mission was to protect the Hutu power.

forces which until then were competing for the

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
launched a war of liberation against the govern-

government of national unity and to integrate
ex-RFA combatants in a new national army.

ment of the National Revolutionary Movement

The classic models which RPA could have

for the Development (MRND) and its armed

applied are integration by consent which is part

forces (ex-RAF) because the situation had

of the package of wider negotiated agreements

reached an impasse. notably :he question of the

between two belligerent parties under the

refugees. When RAF and the ruling class saw

mediation of a third part. the complete

their power in danger. they prepared and exe-

demobilization of soldiers from the defeated

cuted the genocide against Tutsis in April,

opposition decided by the government in power

1994.

and the coercive model which implies the
disarmament of factions in conflict under the

The genocide was stopped by the RPF army in .

supervision of an external intervention (e.g.

July, 1994. All social and economic infrastruc-

UNO). Rwanda did not follow any of these

tures had been destroyed and nothing was

models. It looked for a model which addresses

functioning. International aid organizations

its particular situation: its recent history and

had followed the mass of refugees in the neigh-

that of its armed forces.

boring countries. There the international aid
passed under the control of the genocidal forces
who started to get organized, with the help of
Zaire (current DRC) to attack Rwanda and to
complete their genocidal

proj'~ct.

Inside the country. the government of the
national unity deployed all efforts to reconstruct infrastructures and to set up the recon.ciliation process. The Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA). now the Rwandan Defense Forces ( RDF),
played a central role in that recovery process.
Rwandans' inclusive spirit was a strategy practiced by RPA in its war of liberation: this was

The Rwandan model is based on consent:
former combatants are integrated in conformity
of Arusha Accords (1993): the Protocole III
provides for integration of RPA into RAF. It is
the opposite which occurred: ex- RFA were
integrated into RPA. Contrary to the classic
model. here integration was a continuous
process which took place before. during and
after the cease-fire. The traditional concept of
ingando, solidarity camps, was taken over and
used. Traditionally
ingando refers to the
gatherjng of troops before the attack in a place
where they w~re given the last instructions and
were re-organized. tasks and responsibilities
were clearly specified. They were reminded that
national interests were above individual
interests.

done in order to both weaken the enemy and
realize RPF political program. In the post-geno-
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The objective of the current ingando is to allow

the latter was demobilizing 27.340 soldiers

participants, soldiers or civilians. to go beyond

This process has continued up to date. The

,the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and

country has received dividends from the

speak freely about. the conflict which opposes

security climate as a result of this policy of

:them. to heal the wounds, to accept responsi-

military integration. It has allowed to efficiently

bilities in case harm was done. to demystifY the

fight against uprising of infiltrated elements by

negative perceptions of one towards the other,

cutting ex-RAF and militias from their supply

to assume collectively the consequences of the

base, since integrated soldiers had become

common tragedy and agree on the common

citizens who wanted to protect their families.

future. Ingando is based on the approach of

Besides. these soldiers, once demobilized.

problem resolution, which encourages the

transformed

participants to analyze their conflict. its causes,

economic development and reconciliation.

themselves

into

actors

of

and attitudes of one towards the other and
post-conflict relationships.

Military integration is an important element in
the process of reconciliation and restoration of

Within the framework of military integration,

sustainable peace. The success depends on the

this methodology comprises four phases. The

political and military leadership will, on its

first phase allows RDF soldiers and ex-combat-

insertion at grassroots level and its ownership

ants to speak out about history and origin of

by communities. International partners will

the conflict. with the aim of removing barriers

back up local initiatives but the latter do not

which prevented them from communicating.

belong to them. Finally, in the perspective of

The second phase consists of appointing the

reconciliation. ex-combatants should also be

former opponents to various posts. By working

considered as "victims" of the conflict and

together they continue their discussions about

consequently losers as well.

the conflict and establish close relations.
During the third stage, participants are

The experience of military integration carried

encouraged to analyze the conflict as a common

out by RDF produced a new example of an inte-

problem with shared losses and responsibili-

grated institution. It has allowed also to ensure

ties. This is done not to utter blames but to

security in _the country and to propose a new

analyze the conflict so as to prevent it from

model of the culture of unity and hope as

occurring again in future. During the fourth

opposed to the culture of hatred and despair.

stage. ex-combatants appraise all the process.
*************
Ingando is the beginning of the resolution of the

conflict. The challenge is to always b capable of

The demobilization process in Burundi,

ensuring an atmosphere which allows mutual

by Col. Isate NIYIBIZI

respect, recognition of dignity and humanity of
each participant.

A historical reminder of the major events which
occurred before this process is necessary to

Between

1995

and

49.700

understand the national program for demobi-

ex-combatants were integrated into RDF. while

lization and reintegration (PNRR) in Burundi.
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